

government profoundly fascinate him. He gave unstinted praise to the genius of the German people, but said that he could see but one possible outcome of the contest—that was, the defeat of Germany."

Boosevelt's chief desire at the beginning of the European struggle was to uphold the hands of President Wilson and to do nothing to embarrass him in formulating a policy. With this desire in mind he published an article in the *Outlook*, of September 23, 1914, which was quoted afterwards, in garbled form, to show that he had at first upheld Wilson's policy of "neutrality even in thought," and had been inconsistent in his subsequent criticism of it. He said of it to his friends that when he wrote it he hoped the President would become convinced that an official protest should be made against the invasion of Belgium and he did not wish to put any obstruction in his way, while reserving the right to criticize him in case he failed to make the protest. The article is susceptible of this construction, as the following passage shows:

"Neutrality may be of prime necessity in order to preserve our own interests, to maintain peace in so much of the world as is not affected by the war, and to conserve our influence for helping toward the re-establishment of general peace when the time comes; for if any outside Power is able at such time to be the medium for bringing peace, it is more likely to be the United States than any other. But we pay the penalty of this action on behalf of

peace for ourselves, and possibly for others in  
the future,  
by forfeiting our right to do anything on behalf  
of peace for  
the Belgians in the present. We can maintain  
our neu-  
trality only by refusal to do anything to aid  
unoffending  
weak Powers which are dragged into the gulf of  
bloodshed  
and misery through no fault of their own.<sup>9 J</sup>

His letters of the period are far more explicit  
in defining  
his real views. I quote a few from a very large  
number as  
fair samples of all.